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ABSTRACT

Title of the dissertation:

An analysis of the economic and social issues
associated with restructuring the port of Port-auPrince (Haiti).

Degree:

MSc

For the last two decades, the Haitian economy has been in recession, a situation
which was accentuated by economic sanctions due to the "coup d´état" in 1991. This
problem has led various international institutions to make certain recommendations
to Haitian authorities regarding measures relating to the management of public
enterprises, among which is the Autorité Portuaire Nationale.
Ports play a vital role in the Haitian economy. Almost 98% of the total tonnage in
international trade pass through its public and private ports. APN being the main
public port in the country accounts for about 60% and contributes 3.8% of the Gross
Domestic Product. Port activity is forecast to increase taking into account the
announced policy for the development of tourism. But current constraints faced by
APN such as those linked to its organisational structure, government interference and
lack of rationality in investment, challenge the capacity of APN to respond to current
needs or expectations.
A detailed analysis of the port situation has revealed inadequacies in equipment
facilities, poor equipment mix in relation to the type of cargo handled, poor nautical
access and weak communication systems as well as high operating and port costs
compared with neighbouring countries. At the same time it points out that traffic has
been increasing during the last 10 years. This increase has had the effect for
increasing the pressure on the existing infrastructure, which has accelerated the
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degradation of equipment and facilities to such an extent, that there is now a critical
present need for investments to increase port capacity. According to a study
conducted by Nathan Associates Inc in October 1998 this investment need is in the
region of $US 20 Million to $US 60 Million. The profit generated by the port is not
sufficient to meet the investment requirements and the international agencies are not
ready to finance. It is observed that APN has no choice but to try to stimulate foreign
investment by undertaking a fundamental restructuring of its organisation and mode
of operation.
An analysis of the possible options for reform has been made taking into
consideration the socio-economic environment of APN´s evolution. It concludes that
a leasing approach would be the most appropriate mode of organisation. Through
this arrangement, APN would transfer all activities with commercial characteristics
to the private sector and focus instead on regulatory tasks, standards and control.
However, opposition campaigns from some sectors could be anticipated that would
focus on the ideological dimension of delegation or "deresponsabilisation" of the
government. Therefore, such a course of action clearly carries a risk of stirring up
social insecurity concerns. In this respect, forecast benefits in terms of revenue, port
performance, capacity of investments and profitability may not be realised due to
social and political turbulence and opposition.
To minimise these difficulties the study envisages accompanying measures such as a
compensation package, employee support to create their own enterprises and
development of legislation specifying the new role of APN.
In conclusion, the study highlights the importance for Haiti not to be timid in
addressing its problems in the present world economic context. Corrective measures
must be undertaken to improve the performance of its institutions. A stand against
corruption and non-performance must be taken to avoid the marginalisation of the
economy and the country.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Haitian economy has been in recession, marked
by a significant drop in the principal development indicators, due to poor resource
management. The situation was at its worst at the time of the “coup d´état” in 1991
and the 2 years of economic embargo. Today, the question of loss of employment
due to the unhealthy economic situation in the country is continually being raised.
Everybody has apparently accepted that it is important to adopt a series of proper
measures in order to correct the situation. These measures are expected to affect
different public and autonomous sectors such as Public Administration, Mixed
Enterprises and the Fiscal system.
It was within this context that the International Financial Society (IFS) recommended
in 1994-1995 the application of a series of arrangements affecting, in particular,
mixed society management organisations, where the first aim was to reduce the
presence of the State in the current running of these companies. The Autorité
Portuaire Nationale (APN) was the focus of one such objective.
According to the UNCTAD report on "Development and Improvement of Ports"
(page 2) “the need to develop foreign trade and contribute to national economic
growth places a heavy burden of responsibility on the ports of all countries and
especially the ports of many developing countries. It is essential that ports function
efficiently. An examination of the latest classification of world ports by tonnage of
goods handled or number of containers received, shows that the ports recording the
most spectacular progress in recent years are generally those of developing countries
and regions, particularly in Asia and these same countries have also recorded high
rates of economic growth. Conversely, there is no known developing country that
has recorded substantial economic growth without a sustained increase in its foreign

1

trade, based on efficient ports. Ports play a special role in the development of
foreign trade”.
Today, it is obvious that the "Autorite Portuaire Nationale" (APN) must be
restructured so that it can promote the economic growth of Haiti.
The main objective of this study is not only to demonstrate the need for the
restructuring, but also to contribute ideas for the re-engineering of the port processes,
and to evaluate the economic and social consequences of the proposed changes.
Before proceeding, it is important first to define the concept of "process reengineering" which is quite a new concept in the port sector. "Process Reengineering" may be defined as the concept of fundamentally changing the way work
is performed in order to achieve radical performance improvements in speed, cost
and quality.
This dissertation does not aim to ignore or to minimise the existing studies of port
organisation and management and particularly the studies related to APN. In the
present context, where modernisation of APN represents an inescapable issue, its
objective is to bring the author's views to bear on this question, drawing upon her
broad knowledge of APN specificities, and her solid studies in Port Management at
WMU.
The main body of the study is composed of four chapters. The first chapter gives a
brief overview of the Haitian economy, and offers insights into the importance of the
port, by considering its contribution to external trade, the tourism activity, and
resulting employment. The contribution of the port to the Gross Domestic Product is
calculated through the aggregated value.
The second chapter presents the situation of APN, in particular its organisational
structure and its infrastructure and equipment. It highlights certain issues, which
support the case for a comprehensive restructuring of the port.
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Chapter III deals with the possible options for reform and an analytic study of the
economic and social implications, while Chapter IV presents recommendations,
accompanying measures and concludes the study.
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CHAPTER ONE
1- Basic Facts and Figures
Haiti, one of the oldest Republics in the Caribbean, occupies one third of the island
of Hispaniola and its coastline extends over 1,535 kms. There are 2 international
ports and 14 other commercial ports serving the national trade. ( See Appendix 1 and
2 ). Being an island, its economy is heavily reliant on the ports and related activities,
which constitute the cornerstones of Haiti's economic development
The port authority as a service port is the owner of the infrastructure and
superstructure and provides all port services and labour in accordance with the
decree of March 15 1978 which established its organisation. In the bay of Port-auPrince there are ports which are managed by Autorité Portuaire Nationale and others
by private enterprises.
The international port of Port-au-Prince, which is the main port of the country is
primarily concerned with ensuring the vital supply of energy and manufactured
products and foodstuffs, and transport of Haiti's limited primary resources. In the era
of regional integration and globalisation, a real transformation cannot be achieved
without strong port services that take into consideration the structure of the Haitian
economy.

4

Table 1- Contribution of the sectors to GDP
(in Million of Gourdes)
86-90

91

92

93

94

95

96*

97*

1,686.8

1,939.2

1,925.2

1,754.3

1,557

1,402.4

1,398.5

1,365

806.2

1,031.3

648

670.1

617

749

831.3

886.5

Tertiary sector

2,607.3

2,225.5

1,990.8

2,007.5

1,917.1

2,052.7

2,076.9

2,085.8

Total GDP

5,100.3

5,196

4,564

4,431.9

4,091.1

4,204.1

4,306.7

4,337.3

Primary sector
Secondary
sector

* Preliminary data
Approximate exchange rate US$: (1US$=17.10Gourds)
Source: Rapport de Cooperation au développement 1997, PNUD Haiti, Sept.
1998
As in the case of most developing countries, the Haitian economy has been based for
a long time on agriculture, which during the past eight years has contributed more
than 35% of the GDP (Table 1). This period has seen the expansion of the tertiary
sector by 47% while the contribution of the secondary sector has reached
approximately 17% of which 6% is for the sub-sector of subcontracting work for
export.
In order to establish, the contribution of the port to the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of Haiti, it is necessary to calculate the Aggregated Added Value and
compare it to the GDP. Salaries, profit and taxes should be known by taking into
consideration the year corresponding to the last GDP. For this calculation, only the
headings directly related to the ports will be considered.
For the year, 1996-1997 the Aggregated Added Value was calculated as 166million
Gourds and the GDP is 4,3 billion Gourds. Therefore, the contribution of the port to
GDP is 3.8%. This indicator is very important because it shows the importance of
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the port in the realisation of the “national cake” and means simply that the national
income is provided by almost 27 enterprises of APN size.
1.1- Importance of the port to the Haitian economy.
To illustrate the importance of the port to the Haitian economy, it is necessary to
highlight the importance of the port with respect to three aspects of Haiti’s economic
life: external trade, tourism and employment.
1.1.1- Port and external trade
Whether the primary or secondary sector is being considered, today the
characteristics are such that they are creating a significant increase in the demand for
port services. The Haitian agriculture is produced through a system of inefficient
small pieces of land.

The majority of traditional export products are currently

consumed locally, for example about 60% of the production of coffee is consumed in
Haiti. At the end of the 80s, coffee represented 20% of exports against 60% for
manufactured products. With respect to imports, foodstuffs like rice and sugar have
increased from 15.9% in 1980 to 22% in 1989.
On the other hand, the index of industrial production has shown some improvements
during the first two quarters of the year 97-98 (1.2% and 1.5%), reflecting the
recovery of the activities in the manufacturing sector. This has facilitated the increase
of Haitian exports which have been able to reach the level of 60 million U.S dollars
since the first quarter of the year 1998.
At the same time, weaknesses in the industrial sector, whose products are intended
for the local market, coupled with the problems of agricultural production, has
resulted in a clear increase in importation. Table 2 shows clearly this trend.
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Table 2
General trade
(in Million of US dollars)
92

93

94

95

96

97

97/92

Export

118.4

130.77

107.82

137.3

147.48

192.67

38.55%

Import

256.24

311.5

197.48

517.15

498.64

512.16

49.9%

Source: Rapport de coopération au développement 1998, PNUD Haiti Sept.97
US I$= 17.10 Gourds
Increases in both import and export levels are leading to strong pressures on the
demand for port services. In Haiti, sea transport accounts for more than 98% of the
total tonnage of the country's international trade. This need for the use of the port for
the purposes of import and export would have arisen anyway even in the case where
the national production would have exceeded the national demand level. It is to this
complexity that the international port of Port-au-Prince is exposed. Through it,
passes approximately 90% of produced or used goods
1.1.2- Port and tourism
Because of the direct and indirect employment created, the amount of foreign
exchange that this sector provides to the country, and its positive impact on
handicraft production, manufacturing and agriculture, the tourism industry
constitutes for Haiti an important strategic sector. The country clearly needs to direct
its efforts towards improving the competitiveness of the tourist industry compared to
other countries in the region such as: the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Jamaica.
Haiti receives only about 100.000 tourists/year, whereas Jamaica has reached the
level of 2 million tourists/year. Therefore, the difference is very considerable. The
present airport infrastructure cannot permit a great number of tourists, so the balance
must fall to the ports. The port needs to be well equipped and in compliance with the
international standards. The Haitian port infrastructures are limited to only two
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adequately equipped ports: one in Port-au-Prince and the other in Cap-Haitien which
is the second city of the country, whereas the Dominican Republic has 9 modern
ports with 3 providing specialised services.
1.1.3-Port and direct employment
Generally, the establishment of a port in a region facilitates the development of the
zone and other activities linked to it.

Generally, in developing countries, the

understanding of people is that the port has a role to play as a supplier of jobs. This
is why there is an overemployment situation leading to an unsatisfactorily high
percentage of the budget being utilised for personnel wages.
For sure, the level of port employment varies from one country to another.

It

depends on a number of factors such as: the type and number of port activities, the
technological and education level, the volume of goods handled, and the salary levels
of the country’s workers.
Within the APN context, since 1989, direct employment has been directly correlated
to the above factors. Since that period, the activities have multiplied to include
general cargo, container, dry and liquid bulk. Due to the increase in port activities,
the volume of traffic has doubled over the 10-year period i.e. from 494,794 T
in1988-1989 to 940,345T in 1997-1998. In line with the above developments, the
number of employees has increased from some 700 in Sept. 1989 to nearly 1,700 in
Sept. 1998, which means an increase of 140%. In terms of productivity, therefore this
has fallen from 690T/employee/year to 550T/employee/year.
Table 3
Evolution of the personnel and productivity

No. of
Employees
Personnel
Productivity

Sept
. 89
715

Sept.
90
876

Sept.
91
769

Sept.
92
1307

Sept.
93
1296

Sept.
94
1267

Sept.
95
1446

Sept.
96
1508

Sept.
97
1651

Sept.
98
1688

692

593

602

218

393

289

339

550

512

557
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Source: Service du Personnel de l`APN
Fig 1: Evolution of the personnel and productivity

1800
1600
1400
1200
1000

No. of employees

800

Personnel prod.*

600
400
200
0

Year

* Personnel productivity in Ton/employee/year
Conclusion
Analysing the impact of the port on the economy by using quantifiable parameters as
Aggregated Added Value allows us to evaluate the contribution of the port to GDP.
Haiti being an island, the port has a great impact on the economy and is also the
centre of coastal activities for both internal and external trade. Due to the bad
condition of the road network linked to the sub-regions, the "cabotage" activities
have been particularly important. In other words, the port serves as a “driving belt”
for properties and goods, and it is also to the economy what the market is to an
enterprise. Despite its importance however, the performance of the port has been
weak over the last several years, due to a variety of circumstances. Those
circumstances will be analysed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
Evaluation of the port situation
2.1-Organisational structure
The Autorité Portuaire Nationale (APN) is under a board of directors composed of 5
members whose chairman is the governor of the Banque de la République d`Haiti
(BRH). It is an autonomous organisation under the Ministry of Finance. The main
activities of the port consist of providing services to ships such as berth allocations,
pilotage, safe navigation and services to cargo (loading and unloading), storage, and
the stuffing and unstuffing of containers.
2.1.1 Structure
The executive structure is headed by a General Manager and is divided into 9 main
departments:
a- Administrative department
b- Technical department
c- Operational department
d- Safety department
e- Financial department
f- Maintenance and Repair department
g- Control department
h- Coastal navigation department
i- Port of Cap-Haitien department
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a) Administrative department
This unit looks after the application of the work regulations and harmonisation of
relations between APN and its personnel. It is also responsible for looking after the
property and stocks of the institution.
b) Technical department
The mission of this department is:
. To maintain the existing infrastructure in good condition
. To plan and supervise the execution of new works undertaken by international firms
. To realise civil works
. To assure the functioning of different technical services.
b) Operational department
This department is responsible for the planning of ships’ arrival such as providing
berths, cargo handling (loading and unloading), storage, delivery of cargo and
renting of cargo handling equipment.
c) Fire/Safety department
This unit is in charge of safety of personnel, property and goods stored within the
port area, and is also responsible for prevention of fire.
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d) Financial department
This division manages the funds of the institution, and assures the financing of port
activities. It also looks after the debt service and prepares the operating budget and
financing plans.
e) Maintenance/Repair department
This department is responsible for the maintenance/repair of all the cargo handling
equipment in the main port.
g) Control department
This department is responsible for the internal audit of the institution. In addition, it
controls the execution of the financing project plans and expenses as well as their
justification.
h) Coastal navigation department
The mission of this department is to manage and control all coastal navigation ports
in the country.
i) Port of Cap-Haitien department
Cap-Haitien which is the second city of the country has an international port but
smaller in size than Port-au-Prince. This unit is responsible for the management of
this particular port. It provides administrative and financial services such as:
. Personnel management
. Accounting
. Statistics

12

. Technical services.
In terms of the functional departments, the size of the organisation is too heavy and
has been expanded over time. This is illustrated by the creation of Financial, Control,
and Repair/Maintenance departments in the beginning of the 1990s. In the past, these
functions were performed under other departments such as Administrative, and
Technical. These moves have resulted in a bureaucratic organisation leading to nonflexibility. As a matter of fact, a critical evaluation of the existing organisational
structure reveals in some respects overlapping of functions and duplication of tasks
due to overstaffing within the institution. For sure, this results in a high level of
salary mass, high operating costs and inefficiency. The management becomes more
reactive and as a result takes time to provide response to customer demands. It is
clear that some functions can be combined with a view to having a flat organisation
structure, which would provide efficiency, cost-effectiveness and pro-active
management. The organisational chart of the port is presented in Appendix 3.
The analysis of the Autorité Portuaire Nationale (APN) would be incomplete if it was
limited to technical, financial and operational aspects. It is also important to consider
administrative practices and influences affecting APN in the running of the
institution. For a better clarification, it is necessary to highlight in this section the
trends, which have marked its evolution during the past 15 years.
2.1.2- Political interaction
APN is one of the public institutions with commercial characteristics that, has to
some extent, autonomy of management.

Nevertheless, it is placed under the

supervision of the Ministry of Finance, and the General Manager is appointed by
presidential decree. This situation gives rise to difficulties for the institution for two
reasons:
i)

Political influence takes place at every level of the organisational structure
leading to significant distortions in the optimum management of human
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resources as well as in the definition of priorities. Clearly this situation
generates great conflicts and subjective behaviours, leading to an obvious loss
of efficiency.
ii)

Government interference in the budget of APN is also a logical consequence
of this situation. At present, APN funds can be transferred to the government
account without the competent services at APN knowing, and thus only
becomes apparent at the time of the audit. Similarly, the pressures upon the
General Manager are frequent and either result in excessive employment of
people from various popular organisations close to the government, or simply
the allocation of funds to be dedicated to the execution of specific projects,
that may not align with the priorities of the port.

2.1.3- Frequent changes in Administration
Frequent change is also one of the characteristics of the institution, and has been
intensifying during the past 15 years. During this period, 12 General Managers have
been engaged to head the port authority. The change rate of one Manager every 15
months illustrates very well the great instability existing in the running of this
organisation. Such a rate is totally incompatible with the generation of even medium
term plans.
This factor is not without importance because:
. APN has not been able to develop a long-term strategic plan
. In Haiti, each new Manager comes with his own staff and vision, and in most
cases does not adopt the programs or actions of his predecessor.
Therefore, this situation leads to a continual return to the start; with the same
problems continually arising again. Very often, the same solutions are proposed but
their implementation suffers due to the lack of consistency of thought. This lack of
continuity results in the atrophy of the institution, where development is in no way
related to demand or to current transactions.
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2.2- Infrastructure and equipment
2.2.1- Anchorage area/Berthing facilities
The berths are divided into 3 operational zones, which enables the port to receive at
the same time seven ships of 120m average length. The access channel and harbour
were originally dredged to a depth of 10 m, but due to siltation problems that are
worsening, today it is only between 8m and 8,5m. The port has the following
berthing characteristics:
Length (m)
Passenger quays

500

South wharf

800

North wharf

450

RO/RO Ramps (2 units)
These characteristics have limited APN to receiving only vessels of up to 28,000
DWT. This is a quite unsatisfactory situation for the institution, as it clearly results
in a serious loss of income through not being able to satisfy demand from higher
tonnage vessels. (See Layout of the port in Appendix 4)
2.2.2- Storage facilities
The port is equipped with two warehouses and two open storage areas, which in total
represent more than 100 thousand square meters. See Table 4). One open yard is
being used for stacking containers and the other one for storage of cars.
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Table 4
Storage Facilities
Denomination

Area (m2)

Shed 1

5,620

Shed 2

5,620

Open Storage
. Container

84,792

. Cars

10,060

Total

106,092

Source: APN Yearbook
One of the sheds is not in good condition, few goods are stored in it, and most of
them, after discharging, go directly to private warehouses or import consignee's
warehouses. The other one is leased to Pl480, which is a humanitarian organisation
for the storage of foodstuff.
The open storage area used to assemble drums and timber is located behind the sheds
1 and 2 and linked internally by road to the private terminals. The storage area used
for storing container and cars is in the east part of the port. The storage facilities shed or open storage - are not well positioned and this hampers the smooth flows of
movements either for quay transfer operations or storage of goods. With improved
stevedoring practices, new handling techniques and modern kinds of handling
equipment, the capacity of the open storage area would be increased, it is for this
reason that the port is now doing some reclamation work to recover more land.
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2.2.3- Equipment
The loading and unloading of containerised and conventional cargo are carried out
by a gantry crane of 30T, a mobile crane of 150T, a straddle carrier of 33.6T, trailers,
diesel forklift trucks, and tractors. From Table V, showing the cargo handling
equipment, it may be seen that the average age is quite old, and some of the units
have already reached the end of their economic life. Most of the equipment is for
quay transfer operations either to the transit shed or to the open storage yard.
The port has only the one gantry crane of 30T capacity for which availability is about
78%. Due to this fact and the regular non-availability of the mobile crane, container
ships are compelled to spend more time than should be necessary in the port. In
addition, it is not possible to handle more than one container vessel at a time. Faced
with this deficiency, the ship agents or these ships use their own equipment, which
means an important loss of income for the APN.

The scale and condition of

equipment is clearly inadequate and cannot permit the operations manager to deal
with this matter of vessel turnaround time, which is an important issue. Table 5 also
illustrates the low availability of some of the other equipment. Only the trailers have
reached an availability of 80%.
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Table 5
Inventory of Cargo Handling Equipment in the port of Port-au-Prince
Conventional General cargo equipment
Operator

APN

Equipment type

Capacity

Units

Age

Availability %

Diesel FLT

3-3 1/2T

10

3-14

46

Diesel FLT

5T

1

3

70

Diesel FLT

7-71/2T

4

9-13

60

Diesel FLT

9T

2

9-14

30

Trailers

10T

10

N/A

80

Mobile crane

150T

1

22

0

Container Handling Equipment
APN

FEL

24T

1

21

48

FEL

33.6T

1

21

15

FEL

35T

2

12-20

50

Gantry crane

30T

1

21

78

33.6T

1

18

0

15

9-18

N/A

15

23

N/A

Straddle carrier
Tractors
Trailers

4Ot

Source: Charles, E (1998). MSc dissertation page 16
Furthermore, this situation of shortage of equipment faced by the main port has led to
the development of private ports that are also engaged in international trade. A
significant part of the sea traffic is handled by these private ports. They are:
-

"Les Moulins d´Haiti" quay

This quay handles raw materials such as wheat and Soya for the production of flour.
-

Cement quay
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At this quay, they import also raw materials like gypsum and clinker for the
production of cement. Presently, these facilities are out of service as a result of a fire,
which occurred some years ago. This traffic goes now through Varreux Terminal.
-

Varreux Terminal

All kinds of traffic are handled at this terminal such as sugar, cement and
containerised goods.
- Oil Terminal
At this terminal, imported oil products are stored in several tanks belonging to
different distributor companies such as SHELL, TEXACO, ESSO and ELF.
Situated not far from the main port (about 30kms away), these private ports are
equipped with all the facilities needed for loading and unloading bulk cargoes such
as: oil products, coal, steel ingot, clinker and gypsum, and work independently. This
situation further reinforces the need for the port to upgrade its equipment if it is to
remain competitive.
2.2.4-Nautical access
Nautical access is one of the key physical indicators of port performance to which a
port management should pay particular attention, in order to assure safety of all
vessels moving within the port area. Regarding the port of Port-au-Prince, the
navigational aids system is almost non existent. However, thanks to the experience,
skill and ability of the port pilots, ship traffic has been executed safely and
efficiently. Port-au-Prince is a non-tidal port and there is no navigational restraints
i.e. locks, bridges, etc so, ships can enter freely, without delay at any time.
The SEMANAH (Service Maritime et de Navigation d`Haiti) which is a state service
under the supervision of Ministry of Transport has been created to deal with
maritime safety matters in general, and aids to navigation in particular.

This

organisation is constrained in terms of budget and manpower, and is unable to fulfil
the requirements of a proper MARAD (Maritime Administration). It is vital that in

19

the near future this situation be rectified and a sustainable safety system be set up for
the passage of all vessels under way.
As regards telecommunications, the port is equipped with IDD options, Fax
machines and Internet. To communicate with a ship the harbour master offices use
the VHF radio when the ship is in the port area.
It is essential for a port to have a good system of communication both for its
efficiency and its competitiveness. Even though the port of Haiti is not equipped with
a modern system like radar; the harbour master officers do their job very well. It is
essential that, in the near future, the port improve its communication systems.
2.3- Efficiency analysis
Nowadays, ports are under increasing pressure to demonstrate the effective
performance of their port operations. It is no longer enough to have low port tariffs.
In this extremely competitive environment, a port must be able to provide a good
quality of services, and comply with international requirements for quality assurance
certification (ISO 9000).
In the new conception of the term, service quality may be defined as: “the ability of
the port to satisfy client requirements in terms of capacity, logistic services, vessel
turnaround time, flexibility, reliability and costs”.
Such a definition has the advantage of emphasising objective and quantifiable
parameters such as: waiting time, turnaround time in port, handling productivity, free
storage delay, working hours in the port etc. By using these indicators, it is possible
to compare the level of service at different ports. These parameters are very often in
conflict. For example a reduction in service time may be achieved by a substantial
increase in logistics leading to higher operating costs. In APN`s case, the
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shortcomings are significant for all of these parameters thus, complicating the
strategy needed in order to enhance the quality level.

2.3.1- Operational performance
2.3.1.1- Traffic
The total traffic throughput of the main port of Port-au-Prince has seen important
fluctuations during the past 10 years. The lowest tonnage handled during this period
was recorded in 1991-1992 (Table 6) due to the international trade embargo imposed
against Haiti. From 1994-1995, after these international sanctions had been lifted,
the traffic throughput increased steadily throughout the subsequent period to a point
where the total tonnage of goods handled in 1997-1998 was 236% of that handled in
1988-1989.
Table 6
Total cargo handled in the main port
(1988/89-1997/98)
General cargo (in Tonnes)
88-89

89-90

90-91

91-92

92-93

93-94

94-95

95-96

96-97

97-98

Imports

209,127

269,642

222,002

166,448

307,915

186,517

310,347

403,069

463,081

484,303

Exports

123

384

21

4

306

_

_

310

654

10,859

Sub-

209,250

270,026

222023

166,452

308,221

186617

310,347

403,379

463,735

495,162

total
Containerised cargo (in Tonnes)
Imports

233,305

200,845

190868

100,964

171,172

167,473

270,407

394,187

346,667

407,145

Exports

52,239

48,437

50,129

18,626

29,408

12,674

28,363

32,248

34,993

38,038

Sub-

285,544

249,282

240,997

119,590

200,580

180,147

298,770

426,435

381,660

445,183

total
Total tonnage of goods handled
88-89

89-90

90-91

91-92

92-93

93-94

94-95

95-96

96-97

97-98

494,794

519308

463,020

286,042

508,801

366,764

609,117

829,814

845,395

940,345
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Fig 2: Evolution of General cargo vs containerised cargo
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Source: Service des Statistiques de l`APN
Both general cargo and containerised cargo were affected by the trade embargo, as
explained above. After the embargo, general cargo increased to 495,000 Tonnes in
1997-1998 representing an increase of almost 66%, while containerised traffic also
increased by 48% from 300,000 Tonnes in 1994-1995 to 445,000 Tonnes in 19971998.
Table 6.1
Shipping traffic
1992-1993

1993-1994

1994-1995

1995-1996

1996-1997

1997-1998

552

230

726

728

632

636
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Figure 3 : Ships entered
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Out of the 636 ships received in 1997-1998, it is important to note that 4 % were
RO/RO, 16% LO/LO, 26% general cargo, 50% multi-purpose and 4% tankers (edible
oil). This reflected a rate of about 53 ships per month. It will be seen that from 19941995 to 1997-1998 the number of ships calling at the port has decreased in spite of
an increase in total tonnage handled during this period. This increase in traffic has
undoubtedly had a positive impact on port revenues, and on the economic activity of
the country.
2.3.1.2- Hinterland of the port
The main port is located in an area where the road network is in quite good condition
and able to provide easy access to the countryside. There is no railway link with the
rest of the country however, and only trucks make the connection. The industries
that exist as a consequence of the port are:
-

two industrial zones located not far from the port

-

some factories and several assembly plants spread out within the capital along the
main routes serving the subregions

- agricultural areas in the northern, southern, western and central departments.
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Normally, apart from at rush hours, cargo can go in and out of the port in a
reasonable time. As a result, those industries located near the port area can easily
obtain their raw materials and export their products. Transport costs are reduced due
to the short distances involved. Shipping companies are also situated in the port area
so a constant relationship is easily maintained because of the proximity.
2.3.1.3- Vessel turnaround time
Quality of services depends on speeding up the cargo handling operations and
minimising delays in order to improve the vessel turnaround time, and in this way
reaching a high cargo handling performance. If a port cannot ensure short ship time
in port, the cost incurred by the ship while in port will increase. The direct
consequence is a sharp increase in the ship-owner's voyage costs, which means
higher freight rates. The final victims are then the shippers and consumers.
Conversely, it is obvious that if a port is able to achieve a short ship turnaround time,
it means that the cargo handling operations is efficient.
From the port point of view, as well as from the perspective of the shippers or shipowners concerned, these indicators are of vital importance in any decision-making
related to the quality of services provided and ultimately in the choice of a port of
call.
Table 7
Average Turnaround Time in the port of Port-au-Prince in comparison with
ports in 3 other countries
Container ships
Cuba

Waiting

General cargo ships

Colombia

Mexico

Haiti

Carthage

Vera

na
3hours
12 hours

Cuba

Colombia

Mexico

Haiti*

Port-au-

Carthage

Vera

Port-au-

Cruz

Prince

na

Cruz

Prince

4hours

N/A

6 hours

3 hours

48 hours

2h

23 hours

14hours

14h

28 hours

21h

38 hours

40h

105 hours

Time
Service
Time
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Source: Compiled on the basis of information collected from students coming from
those countries **
* Operations Department of APN
** Accuracy of data should be treated with caution, however reliability is
considered sufficient for illustration purposes.
According to UNCTAD, the grade of waiting that is generally acceptable to
shipowners is 10%, beyond this rate the port is considered as to be inefficient. The
grade of waiting in the port of Port-au-Prince is about 21%. Based on the level fixed
by UNCTAD, it can be concluded that the port productivity needs to be improved.
In respect to waiting time, Haiti has the worst performance at 23h and 6h for general
cargo and container ships respectively. The lowest waiting time in the region is 3h
realised by Cuban ports. Concerning service time, ships were serviced for 105h in
Haiti compared to 21h in Cuban port, which is a ratio of about 5:1. For container
ships, service time in Haiti is more than double other regional ports i.e 28h compared
to 12h for Cuba and 14h each for Colombia and Mexico. In this respect, APN has a
great deal of work to do in order to reduce the gap with its competitors. (See Table 7)
2.3.1.4- Berth occupancy
The average berth occupancy in the main port is approximately 85%. According to
UNCTAD, the acceptable berth occupancy ratios are 50% for 2 available berths and
60% for 3 available ones. In the case of the port of Port-au-Prince, the number of
berths is two for the container ships and three for break-bulk cargo. Seen from this
aspect, the berth occupancy ratio is clearly too high because of a poor productivity
ratio.
The main reasons for such a low productivity are lack of cargo handling equipment
(either gantry crane or quay transfer equipment) and low availability of the only
existing crane due to frequent and lengthy time breakdowns.
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2.3.1.5- Gang productivity
It is important to note that, cargo-handling operations in the port of Port-au-Prince
are executed by two (2) different groups of workers. The operations on board the
ship are realised by stevedores belonging to the private sector under agent
responsibility, whereas quay transfer operations, either to the sheds or to the open
storage area are undertaken by the dockers of the port authority. The second group of
workers is linked to APN on a basis of collective agreement negotiated annually
with their union.
However, it is the normal practice nowadays in most ports for cargo handling
personnel docker to be under one management entity, which takes care of all
operations. Clearly under such an arrangement, better planning and co-ordination of
the operations can be facilitated.
The main port is open 24 hours a day but the normal working hours are 7:00 to 12:00
and 13:00 to 16:00. Overtime starts at 16:00 and can be worked upon negotiation,
but most of the work is finished during normal working hours.
Table 8
Port of Port-au-Prince productivity compared with other ports
General

Colombia

Mexico

Jamaica

Haiti*

Standard

28Tons

30Tons

N/A

20Tons

30

14 moves

25 moves

25 moves

12 moves

25-30

cargo
Container

Sources: Compiled on the basis of information collected from students coming from
those countries.
* Operations Department of APN
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** Accuracy of data should be treated with caution, however reliability is considered
sufficient for illustration purposes
Productivity from Haiti is very low compared to other ports in the region as well as
to the standard productivity level. For example, while Haiti handles 12
moves/crane/hour, the lowest productivity in the region for containers is 14
/crane/hour in Colombia. It means in terms of competition, Haiti will be viewed less
favourably by the shipping lines. Therefore considering the poor performance in
terms of Waiting Time, Service Time and gang productivity, Haiti cannot be
considered the rational choice for shipping lines. (See Table 8)
2.3.2- Financial performance
2.3.2.1- Cost of services
For the past several years, port users have been complaining about the high port costs
of Haiti. In this regard, the general manager has sought to shed light on this question
and asked experts to conduct a study comparing APN tariffs with those of the main
Caribbean ports. In 1997, the “Centre Régional TRAINMAR” submitted its findings
in this matter, and concluded that the port of Port-au-Prince was the most expensive
in the region.
In the light of the above considerations, it is obvious that APN has high operational
costs, with direct consequences for service charges.

Table 9 below shows the

container handling charges in Port-au-Prince as compared to some other ports in the
region.
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Table 9
Port cost/container in comparison with other ports
(US Dollar)
Full

SPRB

Container

UENA

SPRC

SPRSM

LIMON

CRISTOB

$ US

178

175

168

273

284

Index

39

38

37

60

62

BALBOA

MANZAN

RIO

ILLO

HAINA

280

293

270

454

61

65

59

100

AL

Haiti

Index 100= Haiti
Source: TRAINMAR Study (1997)
SPRB: Buenaventura (Colombia)

Cristobal: Cristobal (Panama)

SPRC: Carthagena (Colombia)

Balboa: Balboa (Panama)

SPRSM: Santa Marta (Colombia)

Manzanillo: Manzanillo(Panama)

Limon: (Costa Rica)

Rio Haina: Dominican Republic

The average port cost/container in the main port of Port-au-Prince is about 454 US
dollars. Compared to other ports in the region, it can be said that this average cost is
almost double that of others. In order to compete realistically in the bay of Port-auPrince, it would be necessary for APN to adjust the port costs to, or below, the level
currently prevailing at the port of Rio Haina in the Dominican Republic.
2.3.2.2- Financial Statements
Due to the trade embargo imposed on Haiti, port traffic levels were lowest in 19911992. This translated into revenues of 4 Million Gourds, which constituted a
decrease of about 96%. After the embargo was lifted in 1994-1995, the traffic
improved significantly and, as a result revenue increased from 4 to 221 Million
Gourds. Since then, there has been a steady increase in revenue at an average rate of
20%/ year. This is in line with the continued increase in traffic since the lifting of the
embargo.
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Operating expenses have been increasing year after year. Besides increases in salary,
operating costs were affected by the high running cost of equipment due to old age.
Revenue/Ton as well as Expenses/Ton have followed the same trend. But the
financial statement analysis shows that expenses have increased more than revenue.
This leads to, or contributes to, a reduction in the profit of the organisation. From
31% in 1988/89, the profit margin has dropped to 18,6%, in spite of some measures
taken to control costs such as limiting employment, scrapping old equipment, strict
control of fuel use and spare parts. Obviously, efforts should be made to regain the
level of profitability achieved in 1988/89 where expenditure was about half of the
revenue. In 1998/99, expenditure has increased tremendously to about 80% of the
revenue.
Table 10
Financial Statements (in Million of Gourds)
88-89

89-90

90-91

91-92

92-93

93-94

94-95

95-96

96-97

97-98

Operating
Revenue

94

84

91

4

77

81

221

295

365

376

Operating
Expenditure

50

62

66

5

70

60

171

264

265

291

Operating
surplus

45

21

26

-1

8

21

50

31

100

85

Profit(Loss)
before Tax

29

7

11

-2

-5

9

39

19

88

70

Average
Revenue/Ton

190.64

160.83

197.37

12.93

151.95

219.9

363.73

355.53

432.04

399.48

Average
Expenditure/Ton

100.7

119.45

142

17.23

136.72

163.5

280.83

318.74

313.36

309.22

Profit(Loss)/Ton

59.06

13.43

24.01

-8.13

-9.82

25.66

64.38

23.1

103.76

74.12

Profit margin
Profit/Revenue

30.9%

8.3%

12.1%

-50.0%

-6.5%

11.1%

17.6%

6.4%

24.1%

18.6%

Operating
Expenses/Reve
nue

53.2%

73.8%

72.5%

125.0%

90.9%

74.1%

77.4%

89.5%

72.6%

77.4%

Source: Rapport Financier de l´APN
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Fig 4: Trend in revenue, expenditure and surplus
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2.4- Need for investment
Because of the frequent changes in management, the individual actions undertaken
by one department or another do not always produce the multiplier effect expected
and APN presents the image of an institution which is under-equipped and far from
being ready to respond to the challenges ahead. It is clear that in spite of the quality
of the human resources and multiple credit agreements, the material and logistics
structures remain inadequate to guarantee the competitiveness of the port compared
to other countries in the Caribbean.
The situation is now at a critical point, because the main port does not have adequate
draft nor does it have facilities for high tonnage vessels, which generally choose to
call at other ports in the region. Nowadays, ships are deep drafted and longer than in
the past. Ports, which can receive long and deep draft vessels, will see their potential
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increasing. Despite technical services being aware of this deficiency, as well as the
resultant loss of subsequent revenue, an investment policy taking into consideration
the issues mentioned in the previous paragraphs, has not been developed. It has
therefore proved impossible to elaborate and make operational an investment plan
having as its goals: to increase the capacity by building new quays, reinforce
competitiveness by purchasing adequate equipment; and decentralise operations by
rehabilitating the existing infrastructures of other towns. All that have been possible
are short-term management and investments decisions with very low impacts.
The “Development Programme” of the port of Port-au-Prince was drawn up in 1972
and was to be implemented in three phases. The first phase of the modernisation
works of the port was concluded in 1979, but since then no major investment has
been made. It is not surprising that, after some 2 decades of non-investment in either
ship-to- shore equipment or port infrastructure, the situation has deteriorated greatly.
Some necessary works, and the acquisition of handling equipment are now of the
utmost importance in order to reinforce the port structures and achieve improved
efficiency.
A study conducted by Nathan Associates Inc, in October 1998 on the basis of
information provided by R.A Lowier Consulting Inc. and S.T Hudson, recommends
for the port of Port-au-Prince investments from $US 24,7 to $US 62,8 million to be
executed in 3 stages:
The first stage would involve the levelling of infra-and superstructure: north quay
infrastructure, open storage area for container, general cargo and other areas and
equipment. The amount of investment for this stage totalled $US 6,3 M
approximately. Among the necessary works planned, it should be pointed out:

. Pavement of container area and the road, installation or setting up fenders,
lighthouses, buoys and other lights within the port area.
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In the second stage, more extensive works should be undertaken at the north quay to
facilitate the handling operations of full containers. In particular:

. Rehabilitation of longitudinal beams
. Setting up of standard rails
. Acquisition of other equipment such as tractors, Reach Stackers, and Flatbeds
The amount of planned investments is around $US 11,5 Million.
Phase 3 envisages two scenarios: one for expansion and the other one for reinforcing
phase 2. In the first case, it is a question of extending the north quay and acquiring 2
Panamax gantry cranes at an investment amounting to $US 45M. The second
scenario is more modest with only $US 6,9 M of investment.
2.4.1- Handling equipment
Lack of cargo handling equipment in the main port has led to low productivity and
long vessel turnaround time. Taking into account the age of the only gantry crane in
the port which is 24 years old and its low rate of availability as a consequence of
frequent breakdown, it is clearly necessary for the port to purchase at least one new
gantry crane to support the existing one. In order to ensure proper cargo handling
operations and to reduce vessel time in port, investment should also be made in other
types of handling equipment.
2.4.2-Repair and/or Maintenance of quays
The quays at the main port are not in good condition because of the lack of
maintenance and repair. The damage arises from the violent impacts of ships while
berthing on the quay wall, which affect the beams due to the poor condition of the
fenders. The "Finger Pier" which is dedicated to passenger ships was seriously
damaged after hurricane "George" in September 1998. The existing fenders are
poorly maintained and in urgent need of replacement. Obviously, the lack of
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maintenance of port structures can negatively impact the image of the port, resulting
in poor port services and higher costs to shipowners.

Table 11
Immediate investment for increasing the productivity level of the port
(in US $)
Quantity
of 115.000m2

Repavement

Unit Cost

Total cost

20

230,000

40,000

400,000

damaged areas
Electricity works

10

300,000

Rehabilitation of
2 Transit Sheds
of 3,660m

Building

26

95,160

surrounding wall
Tractors, FLT

4

60,000

240,000

Ship

1

4,500,000

4,5000,000

2

5000,000

1,000,000

to

shore

gantry crane
Reach Stacker
TOTAL

6,765,160

Source: Rapport Final de Phase 1: Préparation des actifs pour la modernisation du
port de Port-au-Prince, Haiti par Nathan Associates Inc, Oct. 1998.
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2.4.3- Training of personnel
The permanent staff of APN is composed of 1,600 people - senior, middle managers,
technicians, employees and workers with different academic and professional
backgrounds. This manning level has been progressively increasing with the passing
years and according to the way events develop. Even if some professional training
was given during these last 10 years, it was difficult to set up a sustained training
programme, principally because the port was subject to demand fluctuations and
subsequent difficulties in running. Nevertheless, training of personnel should
constitute for APN a constant preoccupation in three respects:
1- A skilled personnel is more able to guarantee good quality of services and a
better productivity
2- In Haiti, there is no specialised training centre in port operations
3- The rotation rate of the personnel is significant due to the phenomenon of
external interference and frequent changes noted during the last years.
Faced with this situation, which should lead to an improvement in the rate of loss of
senior managers and technicians, APN should have a dynamic training policy for its
personnel, if the organisation wants to improve productivity and competitiveness. It
should not be arise anymore for people to be employed to perform a certain job who
do not have adequate knowledge to do it. Accordingly investments should be made at
this level. Until recently, training opportunities had been given fundamentally to top,
senior or middle managers. Although in the port, there is a training centre called
"Centre de Formation et d`Entrainement Portuaire" CEFEP, it would seem that no
arrangements have been made to enable senior managers to pass on their knowledge
to the junior staff or to technicians. Of course, those employees cannot perform their
tasks nor take any initiatives, so it is necessary for their managers to always tell them
what to do.
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With respect to this issue, the Malta Free Port Corporation experience is a
concrete example of what can be done, and its application to APN merits
investigation. A group of equipment operators and operation clerks who were
selected based on their knowledge in the job as well as their aptitude and skills, were
sent to Rotterdam for 6 weeks training. Upon completion of the course, they were
categorised as trainers, responsible for training other operators and clerks. For senior
and middle management, special training programmes – for example on Port
Marketing, Terminal Management – were carried out from time to time both locally
or abroad. That is to say that the objective was to train all staff from top to bottom.
There is no doubt that port efficiency cannot be achieved without proper training of
personnel. Haiti will never lose the benefit or advantage of training of human
resource in port operations, whatever the nature of APN´s status after the
modernisation process.
Conclusion
To summarise, the main difficulties facing the port decision-makers in managing the
company are due to:

. Bureaucracy which leads to non flexibility
. Long-decision making processes
. Overstaffing: high level of salary mass, high operating costs
. Non availability of capital funds for investment because of government priorities
for other projects. Therefore the needs for new equipment cannot be met.

. Poor use of profits
. Excessive involvement of the government in the management system
. Management being reactive rather than pro-active
. Lack of forecasting/planning
- High percentage of old equipment. So, operation is not cost-effective
. Ineffective preventive maintenance systems
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. Lack of funds for repair
. Poor maintenance planning
. Difficulty in following new technological development or changes in the port
market
More generally, the objectives of the company are being distorted by social
objectives such as providing employment. Hence the essential aspect of return on
capital, and reinvesting this towards growth is being totally lost. Those responsible
are very often more responsive to a political or administrative hierarchy than to
market requirements.
“Political and “social” considerations have been dominating port objectives and
policies, while the changes in the “business” environment, which are threatening the
viability of the organisation, have not been addressed. The need for competitiveness
in the international port industry can only be met through a reorientation of
objectives and policies. Only by making changes in the style of management,
through the use of modern management practices can port performance be improved
and the difficulties in the above areas be overcome. The nature of the required
reforms will now be examined.
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CHAPTER THREE
Reforms
A significant number of studies, reports and documents have been directed at
examining the efficiency and productivity of the main port of Haiti. These studies
have concluded that the port is not efficient at all, due to its high costs, poor services
and low productivity. So, there is a real need for the decision-makers in Haiti to
restructure the administration of the port of Port-au-Prince. In order to make an
efficient analysis of the various kinds of port restructuring, it is necessary first of all
to describe the possible options and then make an analysis of each of them to see
which ones provides the best fit in Haiti’s case.
3.1- Possible options for reform
3.1.1- Commercialisation
Under this concept a port is required to apply economic objectives that enable it to
run the port organisation or management on a more commercial basis. It involves
rationalisation of capital investment and operational expenditures, working with
greater flexibility in having real autonomy in the operation of the company, and
being accountable for its decisions and performance. At the same time, the company
remains state-owned.
Some governments in their efforts to implement commercialisation practices have
failed while some others have succeeded. The reason for this failure is because the
public sector or the government remains in charge of operation and management.
Government objectives are not based on satisfying market needs, but preferably to
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meet broader macro-objectives such as increased employment and the national
interest. In so doing, the port is unable to operate commercially, and hence is
deprived of its ability to provide users with well-maintained and modernised
facilities.
This method cannot realistically be applied in Haiti’s case because the intent in the
commercialisation approach is to allow the port authority to function as a private
enterprise which is already the present status of APN and will not therefore bring any
change. The autonomy, which APN presently enjoys, is only nominal and hence
ineffective. It would appear that there is no will on the part of the government to
provide the needed autonomy to make commercialisation effective.
3.1.2- Corporatisation
This approach involves setting up a legally independent entity, a public sector
landlord (the port corporation), that manages the organisation while having recourse
to commercial methods of doing business. It remains under the government
ownership but is managed as a private enterprise. This method may be seen as
complementary to commercialisation, but with the difference that the board members
have legal corporate independence. Under the corporatisation option all land and
assets are legally transferred to the company. The port of Singapore, which is one of
the most efficient ports in the world, adopted this method and now is moving to be
open to the private sector.
As rightly pointed out M. J. Grosdidier de Matons, this method has led to efficiencies
in some ports, it maintains some significant uncertainty "precisely because
government can continue to exercise pressure on the company to create employment,
distribute benefits, enter into a system of patronage".
Due to the numerous socio-economic problems, such as unemployment that presently
face the government, it would be difficult for the government to make this method
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work. As explained by M. Grosdidier de Matons, even a legally independent entity
would not be able to manage the company. Based on these considerations, it may be
concluded that this concept would not be appropriate.
3.1.3 - Management contract
The concept of a management contract involves an arrangement made by the
government body with a private interest to manage the organisation during a specific
period of time generally not exceeding 5 years against payment of compensation.
The port authority still remains the owner with responsibility for providing funds or
capital for the running of the organisation.
The disadvantage of this method is that the government will remain responsible for
provision of further capital. The current economic situation of Haiti is bleak: with
decreasing exports, continuing depreciation of the national currency versus U.S
dollar and decreasing agricultural production. In such a critical situation, it would not
be realistic to apply this method even if the necessary money to pay redundant
people could be borrowed from World Bank. Money would be required for payment
of the management team in foreign exchange and to invest in both infrastructure and
superstructure, so as to provide efficient services to users. In reference to Table 11
even without privatisation, it is estimated that an amount of $US 6,7 Million would
be necessary to raise the level of the port in terms of productivity.
3.1.4-Privatisation
Generally speaking, privatisation is the transfer of ownership and control of an
existing enterprise, activity or service from the public to the private sector. It can be
either total or partial. In the first case, it means a complete withdrawal of the
government or the State from the running of the organisation in favour of the private
sector by the means of sale of all land and assets. Thus, the private sector has full
rights to manage the enterprise. Partial privatisation means a portion of the assets is
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transferred to the private sector based on the scope of the arrangement being entered
into. In the port industry, privatisation entails change from a service port system to
either a `landlord` or `tool port.
In a landlord port, there are two main players: the port authority and the private
sector. As regards the organisation of operations, the private operator is the person
responsible for port operations, labour and provision of superstructure. The port
authority is responsible for the provision of infrastructure and sometimes part of the
superstructure. The port authority is not limited to providing only harbour facilities
but may also create added value to the users by offering or providing other services.
For instance, the port of Singapore has invested in the provision of distribution
centres near the port area for use by forwarders/NVOCC`s, through transport
operators and truckers for the loading and stripping of containers and for the
assembly of groupage consignments.
Under this structure the most common types used are:
a- Lease to private companies
b-Build Operate and Transfer (BOT)
c-Joint ventures
d-Outright Sale of assets
3.1.4.1 Leasing
This is an arrangement made by the port authority for renting specific facilities to the
private companies. Thus, the private sector is responsible for running the
organisation, but the government still remains the owner of the land and the
fixed assets. The contract is valid for a fixed period of time in return for payments to
the lessor during the life of the lease. Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Hamburg are
examples where this method has been adopted, and where efficiency of the approach
is well demonstrated.
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It would seem that the government has chosen to entrust the management of the port
to a team of private managers for a period of 5 years. As regards management
contracts, it does not imply any significant investment or pre-financing on the part of
the Management Company.
This choice would appear to have certain shortcomings with the current situation of
the port, it is not a problem of management, because during those last decades there
are people who have been trained abroad in modern port management techniques.
Clearly, the problem is not a lack of qualified personnel, but the freedom to apply
those techniques. Due to the reasons mentioned in 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, they in effect
constitute barriers to the development of the port. For instance, government
interference was too heavy and managers were unable to manage the port on a
commercial basis.
It may therefore be preferable to adopt the landlord approach under leasing
agreement rather than the management contracts because of the incapacity of the port
to provide necessary investments for appropriate port equipment and the lack of
concern of the customer needs.
In the case of the port of Port-au-Prince, the leasing arrangement could be applied in
leasing the existing site and that equipment which is in good condition, to the private
sector, and selling the rest of the equipment, which has already reached the end of its
economic life. The private sector would take the responsibility for further investment
in superstructure.
The major advantage offered by this approach compared to the others is the
opportunity presented to the port authority to avoid further investment in heavy
equipment, which is very costly. It would also provide an opportunity to the
government to retain a degree of control while at the same time permitting the
private sector to work in a commercial environment. Here is some indicative
purchase prices.
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Equipment

Purchase price/unit

-Ship to shore gantry crane

$US 4,500,000

- RTG (stacking capacity 1over 5)

1,250,000

- Front end loader (42t)

350,000

- Reach stacker

500,000

This list shows the very large amount of money needed to purchase modern, efficient
cargo handling equipment. Nowadays, such equipment is the key to competing in
international markets. In the port of Haiti, availability of equipment is very limited
because it is old, resulting in unreliability and costly services. As the port authority
cannot raise the necessary funds for purchasing new equipment, so it would clearly
be beneficial to lease the port operations to the private sector.
For all these reasons, it may be concluded that the landlord approach under leases
agreement is perceived to be a viable approach to restructuring the port of port of
Port-au-Prince.
3.1.4.2 Build Operate Transfer (Concessions)
Under this practice, the port authority gives a private company the rights to build
quay walls, paving, erection of administrative buildings, workshops and the
installation of ship to shore handling equipment with the obligation at the end of the
concession contract to give the facilities back in good condition to the port authority.
For instance, this method is used in Le Havre where the "Compagnie Indusrielle
Maritime" has provided oil and petrochemical storage activities.
Considering this approach, it would appear in theory to offer some advantages. The
BOT arrangement would allow the private sector to build and operate new port
facilities while the port authority would have the right to exercise regulatory
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functions and to ensure the evolution of the enterprise based on the agreement
signed.
According to UNCTAD report "Guidelines for Port Authority and Governments on
the privatisation of port facilities", Concessions under BOT arrangement have some
intrinsic shortcomings such as:
. the risk that the grantee is mainly interested in special tax advantages or in real
estate development
. the likelihood that if the concession scheme operate at a deficit the grantee will be
reluctant to finance new investments or properly maintain facilities
. the danger that the grantee will reduce maintenance and investments to a minimum
in the final years of the concession and leave behind a non operational facility.
However, these shortcomings can be tackled head on or solved when negotiating
the concession agreement and drafting the concession terms.
The BOT approach could be applied in the port for the development of passenger
handling facility in the port of Port-au-Prince. There is potential for the port to attract
cruise shipping for tourists from Europe and the USA. Some years ago these
facilities were damaged by a hurricane and due to shortage of funds, the port could
not put it back to use. So now, there is an opportunity to give it to the private
investors under BOT arrangements. However, the high risks associated with
investment in Haiti are an obstacle to attracting foreign investors. It would seem
clear that the government must take action to improve the country's rating.
3.1.4.3 Joint venture
This concept usually involves an equity contribution by both a government body and
a private enterprise. Generally it is undertaken where it responds to mutual interests,
for instance technological transfer against access to a particular market. It may also
be attractive to the parties to share the risks in a particular business venture.
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This method appears to have been the choice of China when, in September 1993
Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd, owner of HIT and SPA (Shangai Port Authority) signed a
very significant contract, where the terms gave Hutchinson a 50% stake in
Shanghai’s Container facilities.
This concept would appear to offer advantages for both the government and the
private sector because of commercial risk sharing. By joining their contribution in
terms of knowledge, technology and capital efficiency, competition could be
improved and promoted. In the case of Haiti, this form of privatisation could be
applied because it would offer opportunities to the port authority to reduce the
current heavy administrative and financial burdens.
3.1.4.4 Outright sale of assets
Sale of assets means transfer of ownership of infrastructure, superstructure and
equipment from the public to the private sector. Different approach include:
i)-Public offer
This could be achieved through a complete or partial sale of shares to the general
public resulting in the business being quoted on the Stock Exchange and the shares
being openly traded.
ii)-Competitive tender
This method consists of the sale of assets rather than shares. There is no restriction at
all, and any company or consortia can bid. The sale is made to the successful bidder,
normally a trade buyer.
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iii)- Negotiated sale
In this case, the sale is open to one purchaser only which may be a trade buyer or an
MEBO (Management/Employee Buy Out). The government has the freedom to
choose the purchaser and the price is determined by negotiation.
Considering a country like Haiti where people are not too familiar with the
involvement of the private sector in national affairs and specifically where the port
has always been a source of employment, it would be difficult for a government to
decide to sell completely the port assets. It would almost certainly constitute a source
of conflicts between the government and the population. This method would not
therefore be appropriate for the present situation in Haiti.
3.2 Characteristics of the possible options for reform
Under all the major reform options considered, namely Commercialisation,
Corporatisation, Management contract and Privatisation (Partial and Full), it will be
noted that under whatever options adopted there is always sharing of responsibilities
between the public and private. This is clearly shown in Table 12. For instance, in
the case of Equipment Provision the private sector would be mainly responsible for
minor equipment while the landlord authority would be responsible for major
investments such as Gantry cranes.
3.3 Assessment of the options
The idea behind the evaluation of the reform is to assess the impact of privatisation
based on:
. Reduced port cost
. Ability to generate revenue
. Introduction of expertise
. Guaranteed revenue stream
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. Removal of political control
. World Bank or Investment Banks support
. Degree of oversight required
. Political feasibility
. Attractiveness to foreigners
. Flexibility of operations
. Guaranteed competition
As will be observed from Table 13, the Commercialisation, Corporatisation and
Management Contract options provide limited benefits, while Landlord and JointVenture have a greater potential for improvement of the port. In those 3 options,
there is no full autonomy and therefore the government will continue to influence
some of the key decisions of the management, for example appointment of the
directors of the company, tariff setting etc. In the case of Port-au-Prince, there are
limited opportunities that can attract private investors under BOT arrangements. The
port has fully developed facilities for leasing. This includes the facilities for handling
general cargo, container, passengers and RO/RO.
Conclusion
It is important to note that privatisation is not an end in itself, it does not
automatically resolve the port problems if the appropriate measures are not
implemented or the necessary requirements are not met. In order to ensure successful
port reform, firstly a strong government commitment is an indispensable condition
because government has a decisive role to play in the process. It is also important to
have a broad-based consensus among all the parties concerned i.e. top managers,
middle managers, bureaucrats, workers and the public in general. They would need
to be well informed on the evolution of the process.
Secondly, defining clear general and specific objectives is another important
condition for successful port reform, if it is to satisfy the needs of the clients and the
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markets (UNCTAD report on Analysis of deregulation, commercialisation and
privatisation of ports. Page). The government needs to bear in mind that the method
adopted has to match the objectives behind the changes. If not it would be better not
to start the restructuring process.
The next chapter will focus on the proposed option for re-engineering the port of
Port-au-Prince and the necessary measures to be taken to achieve this objective.
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Table 12
Characteristics of the possible options for reform
Reform Options
Privatisation
Characteristic

Existing
situation

Partial
Commercialisation

Corporatisation

Management
contract

Landlord

BOT

Joint
venture

BASIC FEATURES
Term

N/A

N/A

N/A

3-5 years

10-15 years

20-30 years

20-30 years

N/A

Financial flows

N/A

N/A

N/A

Fee paid by
APN

Annual payment to
APN

Profit
Sharing

N/A

Examples

N/A

Morocco

Le Havre

China
Malaysia

UK

Type of investors

APN/Agents

APN

Annual
payment to
APN
NY,
Rotterdam,
Miami
Port
operating
companies

Major international
stevedoring
companies

Gvt. and
Pivate
operator

Private operator

Landlord or
private

Private operator

Landlord or
private
Landlord or
private
Landlord or
private

Private operator

ASSIGNMENT OF PORT FUNCTIONS
Pilotage
APN
APN

Mombassa,
Kenya
Corporate Entity

Team of
Management

Corporate Entity
Or APN

APN or
independent
organisation
Contractor

Landlord or
ind. org.
Landlord

Landlord or
independent
organisation
Concessionaire

Team of
management
Team of
management

Operator

Concessionaire

Operator

Concessionaire

Team of
management

Operator

Concessionaire

Berth allocation

APN

APN

CE

Cargo handling

APN/Agents

APN/Agents

CE

Equipment provision

APN/Agents

APN/Agents

CE

Equipment
maintenance

APN/Agents

APN/Agents

CE
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Landlord or
private

Full
Sale of assests

Private operator
Private operator
Private operator

Facility maintenance

APN

APN

CE

Team of
management

Landlord

Concessionaire

Landlord or
private

Private operator

Security/Safety

APN

APN

CE

APN/Ind. org

Landlord

Concessionaire

Landlord or
private

Private operator

Leasing of space

APN

APN

CE

APN

Landlord

Landlord

Landlord

Private operator

Land use allocation
short term
long term

APN

CE

APN
APN

APN
APN

Landlord
Landlord

Landlord
Landlord

Landlord

Public warehousing

APN

Landlord

Landlord

Private operator

Operator
Landlord

Concessionaire
Concessionaire

Landlord

Private operator

Landlord

Landlord

Landlord

Private operator

APN

CE

Private operator

Contractor
Landlord

Capital investment
minor
major
Port access

APN
APN
APN

APN

APN
APN

APN

APN

APN
APN
APN

Marketing

APN

APN

APN

APN

Landlord/O
perator

Concessionaire/
Landlord

Landlord/
private

Private operator

Maritime Policy

APN

APN

Government

Government

Government

Government

Government

Private operator

Tariff setting

APN

APN

CE

APN

Operator

Concessionaire

Landlord

Private operator

Tariff review

APN

APN

CE

APN

Operator

Concessionaire

Landlord/
private

Private operator

Tariff administration

APN

APN

CE

Contractor

Operator

Concessionaire

Landlord/
private

Private operator

Long-term planning

APN

APN

Government

Government

Government

Landlord /
Concessionaire

Landlord/
private

Private operator
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Table 13
Assessment of the possible option for reforms
Reform options
Privatisation
Criteria

Commercialisation

Corporatisation

Partial

Full

Management
contract
BOT

**May turn
on level of
investment
* Extent
depends on
term
** Port
operating
expertise
* Set by
lease terms

***
Maximum scope

* Takes time to
inculcate in the
business culture
* Limited scope

* Depends on
level of autonomy

Introduce
expertise

* Little expertise

* Open to the
market

Guaranteed
revenue stream.

N/A

N/A

Removal of
political control

* It can remain

*
Short term

** Medium
term

*** Long term

WB Capital
support

* Limited support

*Possibility to put
pressure on the
Corporate Entity
* Depends on
investment

* Depends on
investment

*** Loans for
capital investment

Degree of
oversight
required

* Some regulatory
response
responsibilities

*Annual
performance
report

* Annual
revenue of
financial and
operation
performance
required

* Depends
on
investment
** Review
of
compliance
with lease
terms

Reduce port
costs
Generate
investment

* Loan from
investment banks

* Depends on
contract
incentive
* Limited
scope

Landlord

* Limited to
management
team
Threshold
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***
Extent depends on
term
*** Would include
stevedoring
expertise
* Set by concession
contract

*** Minimal
compliance with
concession
agreement only

Joint
venture
***
Maximum
scope
**Depends
on level of
participation
** Expertise
from private
* Set by
joint-venture
agreement
Limited
extent

Sale of assests
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

*Annual
performance
report

N/A

Political
feasibility

* Little change

* Substantial
change

***
Incremental
changes only

Attractive to
foreigners

Not attractive

* May interest
some operators

* May interest
some
operators

Flexibility of
operations

* Limited autonomy

*** Full
autonomy

Guarantee
competition

* Only inter-port
competition

* Inter-port

* Depends on
performance
specifications
* At current
levels

*

Some benefit

** More
substantial
changes
required
* May
appeal to
certain
operators
** Relations
with agents
key
** Could
increase
between
agents

* Strong legislative
foundation

* Substantial
change

N/A

*** Maximum
profit potential

N/A

***
Full autonomy

* May
appeal to
certain
foreigners
*** Full
autonomy

* Only competition
with other private
ports.

***Intra and
inter port
competition

N/A

N/A

** Greater potential for improvement

*** Maximum potential

Source: APN - Rapport d´Expert au Conseil de Modernisation des Entreprises Publiques (CEMEP), par Mission
d´Assistance Technique de la Banque Mondiale, Mars 1997.
N.B Although the BOT looks the most interesting option, foreigners will not be attracted to invest because of high risks
associated with investment in Haiti. Also the port has fully developed facilities available for leasing to the private sector, and there
is limited land available for the development of additional facilities under BOT.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Recommendations
4.1- Proposed option
There are many examples in the past of private organisations that were once regarded
as modern and efficient but which are now in a state of ruin. In fact, today it is not
enough to just to modernise but requires at the same time managerial, technological
and administrative measures to remain competitive in a world where only change is
continuous or permanent.
Looking into the future, the necessary financial resources and managerial expertise to
ensure a long-term market presence are critical factors in the further evolution of the
port. As mentioned previously, Haiti being an island has a great dependence on ports
to support its economy and needs highly developed logistics centres for its foreign
trade and to maintain the standard of living of its inhabitants. So, the government
must understand the real necessity to apply modern, practical management to many
of the country's organisations.
The two options proposed for restructuring the port of Port-a-Prince would both to
transform it from service port to landlord port status. The approach would involve
segmenting the port traffic into activities or business units. The first option would
involve leasing the general cargo, RO/RO and container facilities, which are in
relatively good condition. The second option would introduce a BOT arrangement
for the dilapidated passenger quays. This would require an initial investment to
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improve it. The transfer of the activities would need to be done gradually so as to
allow for a smooth transition, lessen the impact of restructuring and provide an
opportunity to gain experience with time.
The physical layout of the port is currently as follows:
i.

in the north there are two (2) multi-purpose berths with a ship-to-shore gantry
crane and two sheds serving those quays

ii.

in the south three (3) general cargo berths and 2 berths for passengers with a
“chalet d`accueil” for recording the passengers upon their arrival

iii

in the east there are two (2) Ro/Ro berths with an open storage area for cars

It is suggested that each category of activity, included the terminal and equipment
serving it, should constitute one leasing agreement. By adopting this approach there
would be at least 2 or 3 operators within the port area. The idea behind this
segmentation is to create an open market by involving different interests from the
private sector in port activities, while at the same time avoiding a monopoly
situation, which would distort the market. It would also provide a means for reducing
cost and improving service.
4.1.1 Payment method of lease
Considering the payment method to the lessor, there are different ways in which this
can be done but the most common types are:
a. Flat rate or Fixed sum lease
b. Mini-max lease
c. Share revenue lease
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Fixed sum strategy

Mini-max strategy

Share Revenue strategy

The port authority
gives the
concessionaire the
right to operate the
facilities for a fixed
period of time

The port authority grants a
concession in return for a
variable fee. This has a
floor and a ceiling related
to the level of annual
traffic

The port authority imposes no
ceiling on the fee payable by
the concessionaire although
there is often a floor.

If traffic estimates
are too low, the
port authority
subsidies the
concessionaire.

The port authority may
subsidise the concessionaire
but only when traffic
exceeds the envisaged
ceiling.

This allows the port authority to
maximise its profits,
employment and traffic without
subsidising the concessionaire.

Source: Improving Port Performance -IPP4 UNCTAD Geneva, May 1998
The application of anyone of these strategies is to enable the operator to attract traffic
that will allow him to pay for the lease and also make profit. From the point of view
of the port authority guaranteed income is required as well as sharing of the income
generated by additional traffic.
i The Fix Sum strategy does not appear to be a suitable method for APN because
the use of the fixed asset is compensated for by a fixed amount of money during a
specific period of time. This method seems to provide more advantages to the lessee
than the lessor.
iii The Revenue Shared strategy takes into consideration an annual rental and the
lessor shares with the lessee the benefits of additional cargo activity above an agreed
bottom level but without fixing a ceiling. This method does not provide any
guaranteed payment to the port authority.
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iv In the Minimax strategy the lessor and the lessee agree on a minimum and a
maximum amount of rent based on the actual activity performed on the fixed assets
or on the traffic handled. The bottom and the ceiling amount are then established in
advance. It means that the operator should operate to reach the current performance
level, which is for example 1,1 Million Tons and the maximum 1,7 Million Tons, the
achievable level according to the forecast trend. This pricing strategy tries to provide
a "win win" situation for the port authority and the terminal operator.
This method involves a guaranteed minimum rental together with a tariff rate on
throughput. It is somewhat uncertain because it depends on the traffic, which is
fluctuating. Based on the past traffic of the port of Port-au-Prince which has been
continuously increasing year after year since 1992 and on the expected success of the
future operator in attracting traffic, the author thinks that the Mini-max method is the
best strategy to be applied in calculating the concession fees.
In order to show the traffic trend over the 6 future year, calculations have been made
by using the regression method. This traffic forecast is based on the 5 past year's
performance of the port. It is important to note that those estimations do not take into
consideration the evolution of the current GDP, which could make these values
lower than indicated. Many other factors could affect the result but this is only
calculated on statistical data drawn from the past performance of the market. The aim
of the forecast is to determine the achievable level. The methodology of the trend
calculation is shown in Appendix 5.
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Table 14
Cargo Traffic Forecast
year

Actual
Tonnage

1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2004
2004-2005

366,764
609,117
829,814
845,395
940,345

Trend
441,599
579,943
718,287
856,631
994,975
1,133,319
1,271,663
1,410,007
1,548,351
1,686,695
1,825,039
1,963,383

Figure 5: Cargo traffic trend
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It is suggested that the facilities or services to be privatised should be managed and
operated on the basis of public user needs and in a non-discriminatory fashion. The
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private sector should not be allowed to impose restrictions in the use of the terminals
and vessels of any shipping line should be permitted to use the facilities. It is also
important to be sure that the private company provides a guarantee that all users will
receive equal treatment at all times.
4.2 Problems linked to the reform
The institutional mechanism considered or envisaged will not likely evolve
smoothly. There will clearly be a wide diversity of views and the first steps will no
doubt give rise to misunderstandings, and strong debates and disagreements that will
continue throughout the implementation process. Some people see it as a plot aimed
at introducing a completely free market, once more for the benefit of the rich and
discuss strictly on ideological grounds. But the problems linked to the
implementation of the reform are at the same time economic and social. It is
therefore important to manage these concerns in order to take necessary measures.
4.2.1- On the economic plan
APN presently faces a difficult economic situation with a turnover of 375 Million
Gourds and an immediate investment required in the region of 410 to 1,068 Million
Gourds. It therefore necessitates a level of capital requirement which neither the
current activities nor international financial aid - now very limited- can hope to
provide. The reform offers to APN the prospect of improving the performance of the
port of Port-au-Prince and renewing the infrastructure, which, in the long term will
be very beneficial for the Haitian economy. Moreover, improved competition at the
operational level will contribute to reducing costs and increase the competitiveness
of the port. The modernisation as proposed will have the effect of diversifying the
sources of port turnover which range from charges on ships, goods, hiring or renting
of some equipment, to fees on agreement leases and some taxes on ships. It will also
allow the port to extract the surplus to be used for the renewal of buildings and
infrastructure.
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4.2.2 On the social plan
People who are in favour of APN restructuring will see it as an exercise that will:
. put an end to "clientélisme" within the institution, a phenomenon that is
incompatible with the search of productivity
. reduce pressures on alternative uses of revenues and thus enable such revenues to
be used for the realisation or execution of some social projects.
In addition to those arguments, the setting up of the reform will have to face to
resistance from some sectors claiming it to be "antinéoliberalist" and not in the
interests of employees and docker unions.
The first group, without going into subtleties or details, will present the corrective
measures envisaged as the choice of the government to give up its responsibilities by
leasing APN assets to the private sector, and in this way generating confusion within
some sectors of the population. The second group will see in these measures a
strategy to bring into question acquired advantages, and reduce the manning levels.
These expressions cannot and must not be marginalised; some of them are totally
justified. It is totally right that the envisaged process will lead to a reduction in
employment and a requestioning of advantages. On the contrary, they must draw
attention regarding the relevance and adequacy or appropriateness of the
accompanying measures that should be taken, on the one hand to reduce
dissatisfaction and on the other hand to obtain an even minimal consensus about the
reform. This consensus is desirable before the implementation so that it may proceed
in a calm environment.
It should be clear by the port authority before the port privatisation scheme is
announced or published that personnel reforms will be implemented in advance of
the private sector taking over the operation of the port facilities. The private
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company should start its activities within a clearly defined and stable personnel
environment. Various leasing agreements have failed in the past because the
government has not solved this problem.
The port authority will need strong government support. Because of the radical
measures necessary to implement the changes or privatisation, problems from unions
can be expected. This is why all employees, at any level of the organisation, should
be made fully aware of the institutional reform in progress. It would appear that
privatisation presents some advantages, but of course also constraints, and the
government needs to make efforts to transform or convert these constraints to
advantages.
Clearly the private sector is looking for efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Thus
labour requirements would need to be adjusted to match the amount of work to be
done. Any excess labour would have to be laid off or the port authority would have
to devise ways to deal with the surplus labour problem.
4.3 Necessary measures
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, these measures aim to reduce the social
tension being able to create by the implementation of the reform. They will constitute
an important cost for APN and will be of 2 kinds:
-

Measures to compensate employees for the breaking of the agreement existing
between employee and the institution.

-

Development measures where the fundamental objective is to reduce social
insecurity risks for those expecting to be laid off.

i Compensation measures
. To provide a redundancy payment to the personnel being laid off
. To cancel the union agreement, and compensate accordingly
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. To set up with the private companies or the leasing companies a preferential
absorption agreement of qualified laid off employees.
ii Development measures
. To encourage the development of laid off employees so that they can take over the
control of some port operations for example security activities, cleaning up the port
area etc.
. To undertake fiscal reform aiming at facilitating the restructuring
. To establish new legislation redefining APN´s role and making possible the
modernisation process
. To define policies and rules governing the use of the port, that are approved by the
operators and the port users
. To establish a master plan for the development of the port sector.
4.3.1 New role of the port authority
It is obvious that after the private sector becomes responsible for the running of the
port facilities and services, the traditional mission and functions of the port authority
will change. In the new structure, the powers of the port authority would be limited
to the activities listed in the presentation of the option, namely to decisions
concerning land use, reservation of space for the port areas and construction and use
of public works. The essential functions of the port would be as follow:
i-

Technical functions

ii-

Policy Making and Planning functions

iii-

Regulatory and Surveillance functions

iv-

Safety functions

v-

Monitoring and Marketing functions

vi-

Finance and Administrative functions
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i- Technical functions
The port would have responsibility for:
. maintenance of the infrastructure such as road access, berths, channels, harbour
shoreline etc used by the lessee.
. management of the leases or concession arrangements and decision-making on the
long-term deployment of the land areas and their most appropriate utilisation.
. operation, management and maintenance of the coastal navigation ports
It is important to note that the actual maintenance can be subcontracted in the case of
channels and harbour shorelines.
ii-Policy Making and Planning functions
. to develop strategic master plans
. to establish a general medium to long term policy for the port
. to obtain funds for major infrastructure works and supervise their implementation
iii- Regulatory and Supervisory functions
As mentioned in the Technical function, the port authority is responsible for the
maintenance and improvement of the port facilities, so supervision and surveillance
will be required. In addition to that, the port authority will have to make sure that the
port´assets are properly used by the operators according to the contracts, which have
been signed.
iv- Safety functions
department dealing with maritime traffic particularly in the approaches and access
channels to ports and harbours should be reorganised. Bearing in mind that pilotage
is a compulsory service then it will constitute one of the sources of revenue for the
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port. In addition, it will constitute a means of control for the government on
dangerous and polluting goods, which will enter the country.
v- Monitoring and Marketing functions
During the execution of the policy making and planning of the port, monitoring
performance and follow-up of structural developments are required. Together with
the operators, the port authority will have to co-ordinate research into trade
developments, prepare traffic projections, calculate available and required port
capacities, promote and market the port abroad.
vi- Finance and Administrative functions
This department will be responsible for collecting and keeping records of the
revenues and expenses of the port authority, as well as recruitment and training. As
regards the training aspects, the private sector can provide some kind of on-the-job
training, which is effective and the port authority will served as a complementary
body. In order to do so, it will be necessary to reorganise the existing Training
Centre in terms of teaching materials. Qualified personnel are available for
performing these tasks.
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The following diagram shows the proposed organisational chart of the port in its
future role as landlord.

Organisational Chart
Board of Directors
Executive Manager
Technical
Department

Planning
and
Policy making
Department

Monitoring
and
Marketing
Department

Regulatory
and
Supervisory
Department

Finance
and
Administrative
Department
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Department

4.3.2- Creation of a new port legislation
The government should not have to be involved anymore in the management of port
activities. It will only have the power of law making as regards navigable waters and
the land area over which the port authority has been given management control.
As the role of the port authority changes, as it becomes a landlord, it will be
necessary for the government to create new port legislation, which will reflect the
exact responsibilities of the port. Provisions as regards the involvement of the private
sector should be introduced in the new legislation, thus specifying their rights and
duties. This is to avoid any controversial situation in the future. Therefore, the port
authority will be a regulatory body with juridical status in charge of the management
of the port according to the regulations defined, and will act on behalf of the
government.
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Conclusion
Today, Haiti is at a crossroads where the government has to make difficult choices,
which may have very significant consequences for the public but where immediate
social advantages are not particularly clear. Restructuring of the port is one such
choice. If these decisions are not made, the socio-political context is such that
progress in resolving current problems will not be possible. This is illustrated in fact,
by hesitations at the Central administration level of the port regarding what
investment to make and has been to the detriment of the efficient running of the
institution.
Most of the social and economic indicators such as literacy rate, infant mortality,
annual per capita income (revenue per capita), standard of living, balance of trade are
red (or alarming) for Haiti. The last report on human development of United Nations
classifies Haiti in 152nd place. This weak rank in the list is the representation or
image of a difficult situation characterised by an inadequate or inappropriate
management of resources and a chronic instability on political plan. Over the last
decade, Haiti has been left to its own devices, without planning and subject to a
continuous crisis management. This will result, for sure, in the elimination of a
certain number of sectors for instance agriculture on which the Haitian economy has
long been based. During this period, industry has not been in good health and some
of the processing industries have closed down. Even if the tertiary sector is today
contributed excellently to the Gross Domestic Product, it is unrealistic to believe that
such a situation can really be regarded as to the benefit of the development in Haiti
until or unless better use is made of the new technological information and
communication. The dynamic of this sector will therefore be constrained by the lack
of qualified human resources in spite of the great flexibility of these technologies.
Haiti's development has to rely on the strengthening of primary and secondary
sectors.
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The aim of increasing national production, announced in the official speeches, will
not be accomplished in any other way. The reinforcement of those sectors will also
provide greater welfare benefits to the population and provide the means to fight
against the chronic commercial deficit, which faces the Haitian economy. If the
announced measures to revive the tourism are also taken into account, it is
reasonable to expect in the future years that pressures on port and airport
infrastructures will be very strong. It is important for the necessary reforms to be
undertaken with all despatch so as to bring the concerned institutions to an
equivalent level of productivity and competitiveness. APN is clearly one of the
institutions that should be restructured. In this new world economic order, made up
of economic blocs or groups, regional markets, the removal of borders and the free
movement of people, goods and ideas, it is illogical to look away or to take refuge
behind ideological consideration concepts.
The best choice of alternative causes of action should be that which maximises the
well being of the whole Haitian population. For that, it is important to start fighting
against corruption at any level, lack of productivity, inefficiency and squandering. To
restructure the port of Port-au-Prince by leasing the commercial operations to the
private sector will mean that the port authority will be relieved of its present
commercial characteristics and will focus instead on regulatory tasks, standards and
control. This does not imply either a loss of profit or a reduction in the social or
economic importance of the institution. On the contrary, more significant profits will
be derived from such a reform, due to the enhanced control of the port. These profits
can then finance social projects. It must be accepted that in a country like Haiti, it is
unfair or unworkable today to combine the social contribution of an enterprise with
its organisational functioning or the assignment of funds. Examples are noteworthy
of private or public sectors, which have failed fail in their social mission. The issue is
above all a matter of responsibility, structure and follow-on. The government should
take a clear position in favour of this reform. Indecisiveness or hesitations can lead to
perverse or bad results. According to E.S. Savas in his book, La Privatisation: Pour
une strategie performante, Nouveaux horizons " le défi à relever est aujourd´hui de
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parvenir à une meilleure division des responsabilités et des fonctions entre le
gouvernement et le secteur privé afin de tirer avantage des forces de chacun et de
dépasser leurs limites respectives. Il en résultera un partenariat qui pourra mieux
satisfaire les besoins et les désirs de la population d´une manière cohérente avec les
convictions et les valeurs fondamentales d´une société démocratique".
At a time of globalisation, where productivity and quality of services are key words,
the National Port Authority must be modernised in order to be competitive, while at
the same time reducing the long-term costs associated with this transformation.
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Appendix 6

The tendering process
Four major steps are generally considered in the tendering process:
1- Drafting and publication of a "general notice inviting bids" and of the
bidding procedures
Two activities are involved:
1.1 Drafting and publication of a "background document" giving the economic
and political context in which the privatisation process is carried on
1.2 The "Bidding procedures" refers to
. the purchase of the general bidding documents
. the conditions governing the submission of bids
a schedule for submission and review
. selection criteria
. award of the licence or concession
2- Drafting and issuance of the bidding documents
The bidding documents to be presented for the privatisation for the privatisation of
existing port facilities should include those following points:

. Description of the business
. Prevailing General conditions for the licence or concession
. Content of the bid proposal
. Basic license or concession agreement terms
. Criteria for the evaluation of the financial proposals
. A set of standard forms for presenting the proposals
3- Evaluation of the proposals received and selection of the winning bid
4- Negotiation and award of the licence
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Appendix 5
Trend calculation
2

Year

X

Tonnage (Y)

XY

X

1993-1994

1

366,764

366,764

1

1994-1995

2

609,117

1,218,234

4

1995-1996

3

829,814

2,489,442

9

1996-1997

4

845,395

3,381,580

16

1997-1998

5

940,345

4,701,725

25

Total

15

3,591,435

12,157,745

55

By using the regression method to find out the trends, the linear regression equation
y = a + bx will give the predicted value for the given value of the independent
variable x. The following formulas are used to calculate a and b.
a= ((n∑Yi.∑ Xi2) – (∑Xi.∑XiYi))/ (n.∑Xi2 – (∑Xi)2
b= ((n∑XiYi) – (∑Xi. ∑Yi))/ (n.∑Xi2 – (∑Xi)2
a = 3,591,435*55 – 15*12,157,745 / 5*55- (15)2 = 303,255
b = 5*12,157,745 – 15*3,591,435 / 5*55 – (15)2 = 138,344

y = T = 303,255 + 138,344x

73

Appendix 5
Trend calculation
2

Year

X

Tonnage (Y)

XY

X

1993-1994

1

366,764

366,764

1

1994-1995

2

609,117

1,218,234

4

1995-1996

3

829,814

2,489,442

9

1996-1997

4

845,395

3,381,580

16

1997-1998

5

940,345

4,701,725

25

Total

15

3,591,435

12,157,745

55

By using the regression method to find out the trends, the linear regression equation
y = a + bx will give the predicted value for the given value of the independent
variable x. The following formulas are used to calculate a and b.
a= ((n∑Yi.∑ Xi2) – (∑Xi.∑XiYi))/ (n.∑Xi2 – (∑Xi)2
b= ((n∑XiYi) – (∑Xi. ∑Yi))/ (n.∑Xi2 – (∑Xi)2
a = 3,591,435*55 – 15*12,157,745 / 5*55- (15)2 = 303,255
b = 5*12,157,745 – 15*3,591,435 / 5*55 – (15)2 = 138,344

y = T = 303,255 + 138,344x

74

75

